CEO compensation in the financial sector has been a controversial topic following the recent financial crisis. I use a new dataset with detailed information on CEO compensation of major international banks from 1997 to 2008 to explain how managerial incentives influence banks' policy choices and bank risk taking. Differently to previous studies with a focus on U.S. banks, I can show that remuneration had an impact on bank performance during the financial crisis. Banks which endowed their top management with high risk taking incentives performed worse in the period after the Lehman collapse. Banks which granted more stocks to their CEOs performed better. Moreover using simultaneous equation models I show that over time bank risk and bank policy choices have been positively correlated with CEOs risk taking incentives. From a bank policy perspective CEOs rely on riskier, fee based activities but do not increase leverage as a reaction to their compensation packages.
Introduction
Triggered by the U.S. subprime crisis, financial institutions around the world have suffered from tremendous write downs on their assets. According to estimates of the Boston Consulting Group, the global banking industry's market capitalization dropped from $ 9.3 trillion in October 2007 to $ 3.1 trillion in February 2009 and since then has regained about 50% of the lost market value. A wide range of fiscal, monetary and financial polices has been implemented to cut the feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy. Additional to central banks' effort to support liquidity in the financial industry, governments intervened heavily in the financial system. Total upfront government financing sums up to 5.8 % of GDP on average for advanced economies reaching more than 50 % of GDP when taking into account total support of the financial sector (including guarantees and central bank liquidity provisions).
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To justify the expenditures on bailouts of those firms which are widely perceived to be responsible for the crisis, policy makers have been introducing and are planning to introduce various new financial regulations, out of which restrictions on executive compensation play a prominent role. For example the U.S. implemented the troubled assets relief program (TARP), which provides capital injections to the financial sector contingent on the compliance to limits on executive compensation. In Germany banks seeking help from the comparable SoFFin program need to limit their CEOs' remuneration to a maximum of half a million Euro per year, including bonus payments. Similar restrictions hold for banks participating in the British bank rescue package. Further regulation on bank CEOs' remuneration are discussed and range from increasing shareholder rights over stronger supervisory power to plain restrictions on the levels of CEO pay. Ex-post we can certainly say that banks took on too much risk during the period which led to the recent financial turmoil. Many institutions shifted their business model from traditional banking to more volatile investment banking, relied heavily on loan securitization or overloaded their portfolios with mortgage backed securities whose risk was not correctly understood. High leverage ratios, both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet, aggravated the situation even further. Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that the contamination of bank balance sheets with a great range of problematic assets was caused by the failure of incentive and risk control systems within banks. Bank CEOs are in fact key decision makers who are exposed to various forms of performance based compensation and additionally aligned to shareholders' interests via bank equity. To form an opinion about an adequate regulation of their compensation contracts several questions have to be answered:
First, are the incentives provided by CEOs' compensation packages designed to increase bank risk through risky bank policy choices? Coles et al. (2006) for U.S. firms and recently DeYoung et al. (2009) for U.S. banks study the impact executive compensation packages have on risk and policy choices. Both studies find that CEO incentives do have an impact on risk taking. My work complements this strand of literature by providing for the first time international evidence over a comparatively long sample period. The dataset comprises detailed information on base salary, bonus payments, stock ownership and option holdings of top officers of 74 banks from 18 countries 2 for the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . I investigate the effect managerial compensation has on bank risk by explaining market and accounting based risk measures (equity risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, distance-to-default), and measures of bank policies (non-interest income, leverage) with CEO incentives. The sensitivity of CEOs' portfolio 3 to changes in equity volatility (vega) is used as a measure of risk taking incentives. The sensitivity of CEOs' portfolio to stock price changes (delta) is used as a proxy for the incentive alignment between shareholders and management. Though depending on option characteristics and on the leverage of the bank, typically stock options provide higher incentives to increase volatility than stocks. Therefore CEOs with a greater exposure to options would be expected to choose riskier policies leading to an increase in bank risk, while CEOs with large stock holdings would act in a more conservative fashion. My results show that there is a strong link between CEO incentives and bank risk taking. I find that equity volatility and idiosyncratic risk increase in vega and decrease in delta. Similarly high risk taking incentives lead to a decrease of banks' distance-to-default while incentive alignment through high delta has the opposite effect. When looking at bank policies I find that the non-interest income to total income ratio is higher for CEOs with high vega and low delta. A high level of non-interest income is an indicator of banks' focus on fee based activities and of the securitization of loans, two activities which have been associated with high risk. On the other hand, the total capital ratio and the tier one capital ratio are higher when banks use large option based incentive measures, which suggests a precautionary behavior of banks when increasing risk.
Second, how does remuneration policy interact with bank characteristics, different regulatory regimes and the overall legal environment? Are compensation systems comparable throughout the world and is it necessary to introduce new, potentially distortive regulations or are there already supervisory regimes in place that address the problem of excessive risk taking incentives accurately? Strong supervisory authorities may be able to prevent excessive risk taking of banks which would reduce the need to launch expensive risk inducing remuneration schemes. Similarly, bank supervision may be a substitute for monitoring and could therefore decrease the necessity of tying managerial wealth to bank performance. John and Qian (2003) interpret lower pay-performance sensitivities in banks than in manufacturing firms as evidence for this hypothesis. Different to previous studies the international character of my dataset allows to assess the impact legal and regulatory environments have on the structure and the level of CEO remuneration. I measure regulatory power via the indices provided by Barth et al. (2001) (restriction on bank activities, independence, supervisory rights, capital requirements, private monitoring) and the shareholder rights via the revised anti-director-rights index by Djankov et al. (2008) . I find that the structure and level of managerial compensation in the banking sector has been converging over time. Cash compensation and bonuses have reached similar levels in most countries, long term incentive plans have been widely adapted and equity based compensation plays an increasingly important role. Nevertheless CEOs from the US rely far more on equity based compensation than banks from any other country throughout the whole sample period. When looking at the impact of regulation on CEO compensation the findings of John and Qian (2003) cannot be supported. In my sample banks from countries with strong regulators rely more on equity based compensation than those from countries with weaker shareholder protection.
Third, did managerial compensation actually play a role in the recent financial crisis? Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Beltratti and Stulz (2009) try to explain the returns of banks during the financial crisis using bank and country specific governance measures. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find no evidence that banks with a more risk inducing remuneration policy performed worse during the financial downturn, using a sample of U.S. banks. Beltratti and Stulz (2009) report that on an international level banks with shareholder friendly boards performed worse and those exposed to stricter capital regulation better. I contribute to this literature by extending the Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) approach to an international sample, taking into account regulation and legal environments. Furthermore my dataset allows to investigate the impact of the timeseries of CEO compensation on the banks' performance during the financial crisis. Although I do not find any impact of managerial compensation on equity returns during the crisis, I can show that accounting based performance measures are strongly correlated with my incentive measures. Banks relying on option based compensation and on short term bonuses performed worse than banks whose CEOs held a large share in stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the existing literature on managerial compensation. Section 3 presents and summarizes the data, gives a qualitative overview on remuneration practices and describes the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 shows how the regulatory environment impacts executive compensation. Section 5 shows the result of several simultaneous equation models explaining bank risk and bank policy choices. Section 6 deals with the impact of CEO compensation on bank performance during the financial crisis and section 7 concludes.
Literature
Early studies in the area of managerial compensation focus on the link between remuneration and performance for firms in the U.S.
4 They find that pay for performance sensitivities are predominantly driven by stock options and stock ownership but -though increasing over time -remain relatively low. Murphy (1998) summarizes the literature on executive compensation in the U.S. and presents some stylized facts. Pay levels are industry dependent with lower than average remuneration in utilities and higher remuneration in financial service companies, 5 CEO compensation is increasing in firm size and the option component accounts for the largest block of total compensation. Due to limited data availability relatively few international comparisons have been carried out. Almost all of them using survey data from consulting companies.
6 They confirm the conventional wisdom that CEO pay in the US exceeds pay in other countries and that the holding of stock options and stock ownership are much more developed in the US. Managerial compensation in the financial sector has been investigated by several authors, mainly from an U.S. point of view. The literature starts with Barro and Barro (1990) who verify that CEO pay depends on stock performance. Hubbard and Palia (1995) examine the effect of deregulation in the U.S. banking system on the pay-performance relationship. They find a higher pay-performance sensitivity when competition increases. Burghof and Hofmann (2000) analyze 52 banks from 12 European countries for the years 1995-1997. They find weak evidence of an influence of pay-performancesensitivities on banks' performances. John and Qian (2003) hypothesize that pay-performance sensitivities should be declining in debt ratios in order to restrain managers from risk shifting. Regulation and firm size could be substitutes for monitoring of banks' management and could therefore decrease the necessity to align managerial incentives via high pay-performance sensitivities. Consistently the authors document lower pay-performance sensitivities in the banking sector than in the manufacturing sector in a sample of U.S. banks between 1992 and 2000. Chen et al. (2006) use a sample of 68 American banks from 1992 to 2000 to test whether option based compensation induces risk taking in the banking industry. Using some rough proxies for CEO's exposure to stock options and solely market based risk measures the authors find evidence supporting their conjecture. Using a similar sample Mehran and Rosenberg (2007) find that an increase in bank CEOs' stock option holdings are associated with higher equity risk and a capital build up. Recently Fahlenbrach and DeYoung et al. (2009) try to explain the bank performance during the financial crisis using compensation policies as an expalanatory variable. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) do not find any evidence that banks with high risk taking incentives performed worse during the financial downturn. DeYoung et al. (2009) on the other hand report riskier policies for banks with a more risk inducing compensation structure.
Data & Descriptive Statistics

Data
In order to conduct a panel data analysis of bank remuneration policies I select the 100 largest (by total assets) banks in 1997. This procedure guarantees a sample free of survivorship biases, which is necessary to evaluate the influence of managerial incentives on bank risk appropriately. From those I exclude banks which are not publicly held and banks which do not disclose any information on managerial compensation for at least two consecutive years. Selecting publicly traded banks allows me to calculate stock market based measures of incentives, besides that disclosure requirements are typically higher for traded companies. I then collect data from the annual reports of the remaining 77 banks 7 . The data items of interest are:
• Personal (CEO name, tenure)
• Cash remuneration (salary, bonus payments, long term incentive plans)
• Interest in the banks shares (direct or through restricted shares 8 )
• Stock options (grant date, vesting date, exercise price, exercise date, performance criteria) Appendix A shows all the selected banks and their disclosure policies regarding total compensation, cash bonuses, stock holdings and option holdings. In countries with mandatory disclosure rules 9 information on compensation policies is standardized and complete. In all other countries the amount and 7 For American banks most of the information is taken from the execucomp database and supplemented with detailed information from the proxy statements.
8 Restricted shares are share grants tied to performance or vesting criteria. 9 United Kingdom, Canada, Australia detail of information disclosed varies considerably among the banks and over time. In general, disclosure improves over time, most frequently when a new CEO enters the bank. Information on the exact exercise date is rarely reported.
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Stock market data comes from CRSP for US banks and Compustat for all other banks. Bank balance sheet data is taken from Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope database. The indices describing the regulatory environment are constructed using the procedure developed by Barth et al. (2001) . The data is available through the Worldbank for 2001, 2003 and 2007 . Shareholder rights are measured via the revised anti director rights index of Djankov et al. (2008) .
Structure of CEO remuneration
CEO pay in the banking industry typically consists of four different components. The base salary is usually determined according to industry and firm size benchmarks and acts as a basis for the calculation of bonuses and stock option grants. Short term bonuses are functions of pre-specified performance measures. Bonuses are not paid below a certain level of performance and are capped above a performance threshold. Performance measures are accounting based measures of performance but can also be discretionary measures like an outstanding performance related to M&A activities. Accounting measures have the advantage of being easily verifiable, which in turn makes it easier for managers to relate their own actions to the bonus payments. On the other hand accounting measures can be manipulated and are backward looking and short-run which might lead to myopic decision making. Stock options give the CEO the right to buy shares of the bank at the prespecified exercise price. Although option design varies across banks, the typical option contract has a maturity of 10 years (less frequently 5-7 years) and vests after 3 years (less frequently options become exercisable gradually over time). The exercise price is usually set at the market price around the grant date or slightly above. Frequently the exercise of an option is conditional on the achievement of a pre-specified performance criteria which is 10 In few cases it is possible to infer the exercise dates from the stock price at the date of exercise, otherwise the middle of the fiscal year is assumed to be the exercise date.
either an accounting measure, a stock price hurdle or the stock performance relative to a peer group.
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Other forms of compensation include long-term incentive plans which have replaced stock option plans in some banks. Under these plans restricted shares are granted or a bonus is paid when pre-specified performance criteria are met over a horizon longer than one year (typically 3-5 years).
On top of these compensation packages CEOs typically hold shares in the bank. This stock ownership results either from the exercise of stock options and share plans, from mandatory minimum requirements on CEO shareholdings set by banks or from voluntary purchases of stocks by CEOs.
Managerial Incentives
Similar to most of the literature on managerial compensation, I construct several measures of CEO incentives based on the sensitivities of CEO wealth with respect to price and standard deviation. As in Jensen and Murphy (1990a) or Murphy (1998) Delta is the dollar change of CEO wealth for a one percent change in banks' market capitalization. It measures how aligned managerial incentives are with the interests of shareholders. Vega on the other hand, as introduced by Guay (1999) , is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized standard deviation of stock returns. Vega rewards managers for increasing equity risk and is therefore a counterweight to CEO risk aversion. I compute delta and vega for all the components of managerial compensation as follows:
• Sensitivities for option holdings can be computed directly using the Black-Scholes option pricing model modified to account for dividend payments.
• Executive wealth varies with the value of holdings of stocks and restricted stocks. Delta is defined as the change in portfolio value for a 1% change in the banks market capitalization. As shown by Black and Scholes (1973) common stock can be seen as a call option with the total value of the firm as an underlying assets and face value of debt as the exercise price. Using the KMV model the value of the banks' assets and asset volatility can be computed by solving numerically a nonlinear system of two equations. I follow Guay (1999) and compute common stocks sensitivity to a one percent change in annualized standard deviation by using the Black & Scholes model.
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• Estimating a time-series of company specific pay-performance sensitivities for cash compensation is not feasible given that there is just one observation for each CEO per year. Proxies for risk taking incentives through cash compensation are constructed using ratio of bonus payments to total salary.
Most of the studies using panel data on executive compensation from the US, e.g. Coles et al. (2006) and DeYoung et al. (2009) , compute sensitivities using the "'one-year approximation"' methodology proposed by Core and Guay (2002) . Since before fiscal year 2006 no details on previous option grants had to be disclosed in the annual proxy statements, Core and Guay (2002) estimate the exercise price from the realizable values of exercisable and unexercisable options. This procedure leads to an understatement of the true exercise price because the number of out-of-the-money stock options is not disclosed. Moreover time to maturity of the options are not disclosed and are set between six and nine years. Core and Guay (2002) report that biases resulting from their methodology are severe when the price-to-strike ratios are low. My handcollected sample allows me to circumvent these imprecisions and to calculate sigma and vega correctly.
Long term incentive plans (LTIP) became increasingly popular during the last five years. These LTIPs are typically composed of restricted stocks or performance stocks which vest after a pre-specified period or when achieving certain performance goals. Due to the big differences in performance criteria and vesting schedules it is not feasible to compute sensitivities of these performance stocks accurately. Like most of the literature I treat restricted 12 The equation for equity comes from Merton's model as
The relation of a change in asset volatility for a given change in equity volatility is given in the model by
where σ E is the standard deviation of stock returns, V 0 is the asset value, E 0 is the value of equity and σ V the asset volatility. d1 is specified in the usual way. stocks like normal stocks, which will most probably understate the risk taking incentives provided by them. Table 1 summarizes the main sample characteristics by country and by legal origin as defined in La Porta et al. (1998) . The average compensation amount and structure vary considerably among the different countries with lower levels in the Scandinavian countries, high values of stock options and managerial stock ownership in the countries with English legal origin and above average bonus payments in German legal origin countries. The average CEO portfolio increases by $650,778 for a one percent increase in shareholder value and by $208,143 for a 0.01 increase in stock return volatility. Mean total compensation is about $4 million dollars out of which roughly 55% is paid as bonuses. The average CEO holds 0.11% of her employers equity through stocks. Figure 2 shows how the price sensitivities are distributed among banks from different legal origin. As expected, the sensitivity of CEO option portfolios to a stock price change is highest in the English origin banks, sensitivities from stock and restricted stocks is highest in German legal origin countries and the Scandinavian countries exhibit low sensitivities through all means of compensation. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the evolution of the different variables over time. Total compensation increased steadily from an average of $2,332,944 in 1997 to $5,368,365 in 2007 until the financial crisis melted it down below the level of 2003. Similarly sensitivities towards price changes rose until the beginning of the financial crisis when many CEOs where replaced at the same time leading to lower stock and option holdings. Moreover government interventions decreased the overall level of performance pay. For most of the years the sensitivity of stock and restricted stock portfolios to changes in volatility are low. The increase in Vega in 2007 is due to the decline in price-to-strike ratios for many banks. While a dramatic drop in prices leaves stock options out of the money with low vega and low delta, the equity options get closer to their exercise prices and risk taking incentives from stocks and restricted stocks increase. Table 3 shows the evolution of different components of executive compensation over time and by country. CEOs from the US and Canada rely far more on equity based compensation than banks from any other country throughout the whole sample period. Nevertheless there seems to be some convergence in terms of the structure and the level of compensation. Base salaries and bonus payments reach similar levels in most countries during the last three-year period. Longterm incentive plans have been implemented in most countries which can be seen both from LTIP payments in [2004] [2005] [2006] and from higher levels of restricted stocks. Vesting criteria are used predominantly in Australia and the UK.
Descriptive Statistics
Determinants of managerial compensation and bank regulation
Strong regulatory authorities may reduce banks' incentive to implement high vega contracts, since expensive risk inducing contracts are less valuable for shareholders if supervisors do not allow banks to increase the riskiness of their business model. At the same time a powerful regulatory system is likely to reduce the demand for incentive alignment of CEOs because moni- official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions. private monitoring is an index which measures the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. rights measures shareholder protection with the revised anti-director rights index for each country as described in Djankov et al. (2008) . The control variables are drawn from the large body of literature that addresses the determinants of managerial compensation. Bank size for opaqueness and firm complexity. Opaque banks may have a higher need for aligning CEOs' incentives because of high monitoring costs. The market-to-book ratio is connected to banks' investment opportunity set. Bank with more investment opportunities are more likely to provide managers with risk taking incentives to reduce costs from forgone high risk investment projects. 13 Tenure, CEO turnover and salary represent both CEOs' possibility to diversify their wealth and managerial entrenchment. Diversified CEOs are less exposed to firm specific risk and therefore less averse to an increase of risk. Moreover banks will most likely adjust gradually to their CEOs target incentive levels. Sigma measures the daily standard deviation of equity returns over a three year window. Banks with riskier returns may reduce risk taking incentives. Distress is a dummy variable which takes the value one when stock prices dropped by more than ten percent.
The results in Table 4 show a positive correlation between the incentive measures and regulation. Strong supervision and restrictions on bank activities seem to increase the necessity of aligning incentives through compensation, which contradicts the findings of John and Qian (2003) , who state that regulation and CEO incentives are substitutes. High values of delta do not come exclusively from options but also from stock holdings. They are therefore not just a by-product of high risk-taking incentives through options. More evidence can be found in Table 5 which shows that bonus payments, stock holdings, the value of option packages and total compensation are higher in countries with strong regulators. An explanation could be that regulators encourage incentive alignments in order to reduce risk taking or to prevent CEOs from malpractice. Since not only delta but also vega is increasing in regulatory power and in restrictiveness of bank activities it seems reasonable to suspect that when restrictions and supervision are higher banks try to counterbalance this by inducing managers to take on more risk.
Private monitoring does not have a significant impact on remuneration which confirms the finding that supervison and incentive alignment through compensation are not substitutes. As expected alignment of CEO wealth and shareholder wealth is better in countries with higher levels of shareholder protection. Independent regulators seem to encourage banks to increase delta and vega which is in line with the findings on regulatory power and bank restrictions. In general large banks pay higher salaries, grant more valuable stock options but endow their CEOs with a smaller fraction of equity. CEOs' portfolio of stocks, options and restricted stocks is growing over time.
The effect of managerial incentives on bank risk and bank policy variables
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are typically mitigated by tying managers' wealth to firm performance using bonus programs and stock option schemes. On the one hand high sensitivity of compensa- Table 4 : Regression of CEO incentive measures on variables defining the legal and regulatory environment and control variables. Delta is the sensitivity of CEOs' portfolio to a one percent change in stock price. Vega is the sensitivity to a 0.01 increase in volatility. The portfolios considered include stocks, restricted stocks, options or a combination of those. Rights measures shareholder protection with the anti-director rights index, official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions, private monitoring is an index which measures the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. The control variables are CEO turnover which takes value one if there has been a change in the position of the CEO, CEO tenure, the market-to-book ratio, total cash compensation, the logarithm of total assets, the standard deviation of earnings forecasts, standard deviation of daily equity return over the last two years. A financial distress dummy takes value one if equity returns dropped by more than ten percent. All regressions include year dummies. Table 5 : Regression of CEO compensation characteristics on variables defining the legal and regulatory environment and control variables. Bonus is the dollar amount of bonus payments, restricted stock and stock is the percentage of equity held in the bank, option value is the Black&Scholes value of option holdings, total compensation is the total value of cash compensation and cash compensation is the non-performance related part. Rights measures shareholder protection with the anti-director rights index, official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions, private monitoring is an index which measures the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. The control variables are CEO turnover which takes value one if there has been a change in the position of the CEO, CEO tenure, the market-to-book ratio, total cash compensation, the logarithm of total assets, the standard deviation of earnings forecasts, standard deviation of daily equity return over the last two years. A financial distress dummy takes value one if equity returns dropped by more than ten percent. All regressions include year dummies. tion packages with respect to equity returns guarantee a better alignment of shareholders' interests with managerial incentives. On the other hand high pay-performance sensitivities increase managers' exposure to equity risk. Managerial wealth in the form of stocks, options, bonus payments and human capital is linked to firm performance and is in general not diversifiable such that managers are exposed to more risk than diversified shareholders. The resulting agency conflict can induce managers to forgo profitable investment projects as has been shown for example by Smith and Stulz (1985) . As a consequence securities whose value is increasing in equity volatility like options or bonus programs are used to induce managerial risk taking. Guay (1999) uses the vega of managers' stock option portfolios as a measure of convexity and finds that it is positively correlated with stock return volatility. Coles et al. (2006) argue that shareholders set their CEO's delta and vega such that shareholder value is maximized. They find that higher vega leads to riskier policy choices 14 while an increase in delta leads to the implementation of more conservative corporate policies.Therefore I expect that banks implement riskier strategies when CEO incentives are aligned through high vega. The effect of delta on risk shifting behavior is not clear. On the one hand managers are exposed to more risk the higher delta, on the other hand alignment to shareholders' incentives could lead to the acceptance of high risk but positive net present value projects which would increase firm risk.
Endogeneity is clearly an issue when analyzing the relationship between incentives and risk measures. The principal agent model predicts that managerial compensation structure is dependent on firm risk. Managers of risky firms would want higher fixed salaries and less performance related pay. I use a system of equation to address this point. In the model executive compensation and equity risk are jointly determined and dependent on bank balance sheet data and on regulatory and legal characteristics. The independent variables used to explain delta and vega are the same as in the previous section.
To test the hypotheses several market and accounting based measures of bank risk and bank policy are employed. The first variable is the annualized standard deviation of equity returns measured over a 120 trading day win-dow. To control for market wide effects I use an industry CAPM model with the STOXX Global 1800 Banks index as market index. The resulting Beta is used as a proxy for systematic risk and the standard errors of the regression are used as proxies for the idiosyncratic component of risk. The fourth measure of bank risk employed is the distance-to-default, defined as the number of standard deviations the value of assets is away from default. As default point I use the face value of debt and I assume a one year maturity. An advantage of the distance-to-default over the beforementioned risk measures is, that it includes information on asset volatility, the market value of assets and on leverage. Gropp et al. (2002) argue that a distance-to-default measure is in fact a leading indicator of bank fragility. When looking at bank policy variables three variables are used: The ratio of equity to total assets represents the leverage decision of bank managers. Although tied by regulation banks do have some discretion when setting their capital structure. A similar measure is the Tier 1 ratio, which also takes into account the riskiness of assets. DeYoung and Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2006) find that fee based activities are associated with higher risk than traditional lending activities. Stiroh (2006) links various components of non-interest income (revenues from investment banking, loan sales, other non-interest income, sale of assets and net securitization) with risk. The last proxy for risky policy choices is therefore total Non-interest income scaled by net income.
I first report results of 3SLS regressions of bank risk measures on CEO incentives and control variables. The control variables and their hypothesized effect on bank risk are: (1) The market-to-book ratio is considered a measure of banks' franchise value. The franchise represents the banks service business which is in general riskier than banks' asset portfolio. High market to book ratios may also result when many of the loans originated are not retained in the bank. Accordingly I expect a positive correlation between market-to-book ratios and bank risk. (2) The capital ratio is defined as total equity divided by total assets. High capital ratios are expected to lead to lower risk. Alternatively I use the risk weighted Tier 1 ratio. (3) High levels of deposit financing make banks less dependent on refinancing their activities on the capital markets and might proof a more stable source of capital when markets freeze up. I would therefore expect banks with high levels of deposit to total assets to be less risky. (4) Large banks are more diversified than small banks but may take on higher risks because of implicit "'too big to fail"' guarantees. (5) GDP growth as a measure of economic stability in the economy. Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of the estimations of the simultaneous equation models. In each specification the jointly determined variables are the measure of risk, vega and delta. Bank risk and CEO incentives are thought to be chosen simultaneously, depending on bank characteristics and on the legal and regulatory environment. Panel A in Table 6 shows the results for the model with the standard deviation of equity as proxy for bank risk, the specification in Panel B uses systematic risk as a proxy for risk. Table 7 contains two systems' specifications. Panel A shows the specification with systematic risk, in Panel B the distance-to-default is the measure of bank risk. The identifying restrictions should be clear from the tables. I find that high vega contract lead to higher volatilities, higher idiosyncratic risk and higher systematic risk. These findings are in line with the hypotheses formulated above and with the findings in the literature on US firms (Coles et al. (2006) ) and on US banks (DeYoung et al. (2009)). Option based compensation leading to high vega contracts induces managers to increase bank risk whereas stock holdings make CEOs more vulnerable to stock price decreases and therefore reduce their incentive to increase risk.
CEO incentives and bank policy
In this sub-section I will focus on the channels through which banks increase risk. 8 shows the results of three simultaneous equation models with non-interest income, tier 1 ratio and total capital ratio as bank policy variables. Bank policies, vega and delta are thought to be chosen simultaneously taking into account lagged bank characteristics and the legal and regulatory environment. The results show that banks with high vega CEOs obtain a higher proportion of total income from non-interest activities, which are presumably riskier than the traditional lending business. On the other hand the two capital ratios are increasing in vega and decreasing in delta. This suggests that leverage is not a policy measure that CEOs can use to increase risk but a mean to counterbalance CEO risk taking through other channels, namely by increasing fee based activities. 6. Managerial compensation and the financial crisis Beltratti and Stulz (2009) try to explain bank returns after the Lehman collapse by looking at bank-level governance, country level regulation and bank balance sheets. On the bank-governance side they find that banks with shareholder friendly boards performed worse during the crisis, but they cannot identify an effect of compensation policy proxies on bank returns. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) use US-data on CEO compensation to identify the effect of stock and option based CEO compensation on banks' performance during the recent financial crisis. They find not only that high risk taking incentives and strong alignment with shareholders' interests had no impact on a bank's performance during the crisis, but also that CEOs' portfolio values declined considerably. There seems to be no evidence of CEOs foreseeing the financial downturn and reducing their exposure to stocks. In general we would expect banks to perform better in a stricter regulatory environment, with CEOs well aligned to bank performance and with little risk taking incentives. A compensation structure rewarding long-term performance rather than short term profits would be considered favorable.
I follow the approach of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and try to explain stock market returns and accounting measures of performance (ROA and ROE) during the financial crisis in my international sample. Different to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) I use four different measures of risk taking incentives. The option vega, vega from stocks and options and vega from stocks, options and restricted stocks. To take into account that most likely risky bank policies have not been implemented just before the crisis but that exposure to risk has been implemented over several years I take not only the level of vega in 2006 but also the average vega over the years 2001 to 2006 into account. Additionally the ratio of cash bonus to salary is taken as a proxy for short term risk taking incentives. Bonus payments are typically based on accounting measures and related to the previous fiscal year, which makes this a backward looking measure. However it is interesting to include because different to options, short term bonus programs may give incentives to increase short-term profits while reducing long-term returns. Controll variables are chosen to represent the regulatory environment (Rights, Official, Capital, Independence, Private Monitoring) and bank characteristics (Size, Market-to-book ratio, Deposit ratio, Capital ratio). Banks with higher deposit ratios and high levels of capital are thought to be less dependent on outside financing when markets freeze up. The stock market return during CEOs' tenure controlls for the possibility that high delta and vega are a result of good past performance which proxies for some bank or CEO characteristics that influence performance during the crisis.
In line with the findings of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) the results in Table 9 show that CEO compensation did not impact the equity returns of banks during July 2007 and December 2008 in an international sample. For most of the specifications neither high vega contracts, nor low delta contracts, nor high bonuses had a negative influence on returns. There seems to be some evidence that banks with high levels of stock based compensation in the year before the collapse of Lehman performed better. On the other hand when looking at vega it makes no difference whether we look at the riskmeasures in 2006 or on the average risk measures over the period 2001 to 2006. Banks with higher deposits and from a regulatory environment that supports private monitoring did better, while banks from countries with strong regulators performed worse. Table 10 and Table 11 on the other hand show a completely different picture. Accounting performance seems to depend strongly on the incentives provided to the CEO. Return on equity and return on assets have been lower for banks with CEOs with high vega contracts in 2006 and for CEOs with a high proportion of bonus payments. Contrary banks whose CEOs have high delta contracts performed better during the crisis. An explanation for those results could be that stock markets overreacted and undervalued banks which were in fact healthier than their competitors. Table 12 Deposit is ratio the ratio of deposits to total assets. Rights the anti-director rights index, official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions, private monitoring is an index of the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Deposit is ratio the ratio of deposits to total assets. Rights the anti-director rights index, official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions, private monitoring is an index of the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Deposit is ratio the ratio of deposits to total assets. Rights the anti-director rights index, official is an index of supervisory power, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, independence measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, capital is an index of regulatory capital restrictions, private monitoring is an index of the extent to which supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring. 
Conclusion
This paper uses a new hand-collected dataset to address the topic of managerial compensation in the financial sector throughout the world. First I describe the development of structure and level of executive compensation. The main findings are that cash compensation and bonuses have reached similar levels in most countries, long term incentive plans have been widely adapted and equity based compensation plays and increasingly important role. CEOs from the US rely far more on equity based compensation than banks from any other country throughout the whole sample period. When looking at the impact of regulation on CEO compensation the findings of John and Qian (2003) cannot be supported. Regulation and equity incentives are not substitutes. In my sample banks from countries with strong regulators rely stronger on equity based compensation than those from from countries with weaker shareholder protection. After describing the main features of the dataset I try to explain bank risk taking with the structure of a CEO's compensation contract. My results show that there is a strong link between CEO incentives and bank risk taking. I find that equity volatility and idiosyncratic risk increase in vega and decreases in delta. Similarly high risk taking incentives lead to a decrease of banks' distance-to-default while incentive alignment through high delta has the opposite effect. When looking at bank policies I find that the non-interest income to total income ratio is higher for CEOs with high vega and low delta. On the other hand the total capital ratio and the tier one capital ratios are higher when banks use large option based incentive measures, which suggests a precautionary behavior of banks when increasing risk. This general result leads to the conjecture that bank performance during the financial crisis could be explained with the level of executive compensation.
Although I do not find any impact of managerial compensation on equity returns during the financial crisis I can show that accounting based performance measures are strongly correlated with my incentive measures. Banks relying on option based compensation and on short term bonuses performed worse than banks whose CEOs held a large share in stocks. An explanation for this result could be that stock markets overreacted and undervalued banks which were in fact healthier than their competitors.
A. Sample banks Table 13 : Columns two to five show the period when information was disclosed on total compensation, cash bonuses, stock holdings and option holdings respectively.
